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Of the forty banks included in the world’s largest 500 firms, none operate on 
a global basis.  All but one are heavily dependent on their home region, with 
an average of 78.3% of their sales being intra-regional.  The other bank is 
European owned but has a majority of its sales in North America, i.e. it is 
host-region oriented.  The insularity of the world’s largest banks is not a 
sector- specific factor—only nine of the world’s 500 largest firms are global, 
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Recent research has demonstrated that the vast majority of international business activity 
is conducted on a regional basis, rather than globally. Regional is defined as the large 
"triad" markets of the European Union (EU), the United States (or, more broadly, 
NAFTA) and Japan (or, more broadly, all of Asia). This research is illustrated in Rugman 
(2000) and Rugman (2005).  
For 380 of the world's 500 largest companies, data on their geographic sales in the 
"broad" triad regions of Europe, North America, and Asia (including Oceania) are 
available in a database called RNGMA.  Of these 380, 180 are in manufacturing, leaving 
200 in services. Of the 200 service MNEs for which information is available, there are 40 
in the banking industry and 27 in other financial industries, see Table 1.  
Table 1 here 
 
In previous papers, a revenue-based classification for firms’ regional scope was 
developed, Rugman and Brain (2003), Rugman and Verbeke (2004), Rugman (2005).  
Global firms are defined as deriving over 20% of their sales in each region of the broad 
triad, but less than 50% in any one region.  Bi-regional firms are defined as deriving over 
20% of their sales in two regions of the triad, including their own, but less than 50% in 
the region in which they are headquartered.  Host-region firms are defined as deriving 
over 50% of their sales in a region other than their own.  Home-region oriented firms 
derive over 50% of their sales in the region in which they are headquartered.   
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Regional, Not Global, Banking 
Over the last 20 years, a trend to open domestic markets to competition has 
propelled a number of financial services firms to expand internationally. This has mainly 
been accomplished through cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Despite this 
liberalization, financial services continue to be highly localized in their home region. Not 
only are financial companies more localized than manufacturing companies, but they are 
also less likely to expand within their own region than are most industries in the 
manufacturing sector.  
  Nonetheless, more than ever, financial firms have now diversified their activities 
across many business lines. As a result of liberalization within markets, financial firms 
now offer commercial banking, investment banking, and insurance services. This makes 
an examination of a firm’s global scope even more difficult as some business lines 
exhibit more international diversification than others.  
  The data offered in this paper show that financial institutions continue to be 
localized in their revenue generation, and that this is true for most of their business lines. 
Larger banks, the data also shows, are more likely to engage in significant operations 
across regions. Related findings appear in Grosse (2005). 
  As shown in Table 2, none of the 40 banks for which data are available in the top 
500 are global; indeed, 39 are classified as “home-region oriented”, with a majority of 
their sales in their home region of the triad. Of these, five banks derive all their revenues 
from within their home region. One bank is “host-region oriented”, as the European bank, 
Santander, has 55.7% of its sales in the Americas, mainly Latin America. Across all the 
40 banks, the average home-region sales figure is 78.3%. 
 
Table 2 here   4
 
  In terms of the distribution of extra-regional sales and revenues of the 40 banks, 
higher percentages of extra-regional sales are associated with higher revenues. Thus a 
large degree of resources is necessary to significantly access foreign regions. Among the 
largest banks, European banks have a higher level of extra-regional sales than North 
American banks.  
There are data for another 27 financial services companies in the top 500. These 
include diversified financials, insurance, and securities companies. Again, all but one of 
these is home-region oriented. But ING, a European insurance company, has 51.4% of its 
sales in North America. Across all 27 financial institutions the average home-region sales 
figure is 71.9%, see Table 3. 
Table 3 here      
In terms of the relationship between size and global scope for the 27 financial 
service companies not classified as banks, as is the case with banks, larger firms are more 
likely to exhibit a higher percentage of extra-regional sales. In addition, European firms 
once again show higher levels of extra-regional sales than their North American and 
Asian counterparts.  
The issue of transfer pricing—the artificial reporting of profit across taxation 
jurisdictions that is prevalent in financial services—puts in doubt the integrity of our 
conclusions. Unfortunately, other financial indicators of a firm’s global scope, such as 
profit, are exposed to the same problem. Non-financial indicators, such as the number of 
employees, may also not represent the true importance of a given region if some of the 
international operations are processed in another region. Similarly, other indicators might 
not provide a full picture of a firm’s expansion because they are only relevant to a line of 
business. Bank branches might provide insight into the regional retail operations of a   5
bank but might not represent other lines of business, such a credit cards, securities, or 
insurance. This paper uses revenues for all cases except for Citigroup, which reports 
income.          
 
Barriers to Global Expansion in Banking  
 
The banking and other financial services industry does not export material goods, and for 
that reason, tariff barriers to trade have no direct impact on the industry. Non-tariff 
barriers to trade, such as government regulations and the domestic environment 
(including business, cultural, and language differences) are the relevant issues for an 
analysis of international expansion. These non-tariff barriers to trade make foreign direct 
investment the primary means of international expansion in the banking and financial 
services industry.  
  Around the world, all governments heavily regulate their banking and financial 
services industries. Some of these regulations are uniform to all banks while others 
specifically target foreign banks. Restrictions on licensing, for instance, might make the 
emergence of a new, domestic, or foreign bank very difficult while limitations on branch 
expansion by foreign banks target non-domestic banks. Similarly, some nations limit the 
share of the equity in a bank that can be held by any one shareholder, regardless of 
nationality, while other nations specifically limit the amount of foreign ownership 
allowed in a bank. Interstate banking restrictions in the United States, which have now 
been overturned, made a large presence by a foreign bank difficult across state lines. 
Restrictions on the types of services that a bank may provide also limit the ability of 
foreign banks to expand across all its business lines. These restrictions have at times been 
extra-territorial, as was the case pre-1999 in the United States when a foreign bank could 
not merge with a securities or insurance firm in its own region and continue to operate in   6
the United States. Some countries specifically restrict the types of services a foreign bank 
might provide in preference to its domestic banks. China, for example, restricts foreign 
banks’ participation in local currency operations. There are many layers of regulations 
that may affect the ability of a bank to expand into foreign regions, and this is one factor 
that undermines the possibility of attaining economies of scale in foreign regions.  
A related issue is whether a service company, depending on key human resources 
and capital, can effectively compete in a foreign country in the long run. In developing 
countries, access to capital is particularly scarce, and domestic banks in these countries 
may be unstable and lack the trust of citizens. In this case, a trusted foreign bank might 
have a competitive advantage over its domestic counterparts. This advantage can allow 
the foreign bank to expand in the country’s development years to become a large player 
with good knowledge of the market at future stages of development. An example of this 
advantage can be seen in Citibank’s acquisition of Banamex in Mexico. Shortly after the 
merger, the company gained 1.5 million client accounts. Similarly, the previously state-
run banks of Brazil gained credibility after being auctioned to large foreign banks with 
stable reputations.  
Across triad regions, however, international expansion in the financial sector is 
less likely. The United States and E.U. both have trusted domestic banks and human 
resources personnel that tailor products to their domestic market. Organic growth is 
unlikely to be a successful entry strategy because of the established domestic 
competition. Foreign banks are more likely to undertake acquisitions of already 
established banks in the market. This is still a risky strategy. The success of the acquired 
subsidiary depends on the human resources within it. Foreign banks must be cautious and 
provide enough autonomy to the subsidiary to continue providing competitive locally-  7
responsive products. Corporate cultural clashes have seen much of an acquisition 
evaporate in terms of human resources.  
  Still in question is whether the inter-triad exchange of ownership brings with it 
any economies of scale that cannot be achieved through expanding intra-regionally. 
Traditionally, an assumption is made that diversifying into foreign markets decreases 
risk. It is highly probably, however, that this benefit is outweighed by the burden of 
overcoming regulations and information costs, including cultural and language 
differences. In addition, most firm-specific advantages are not transferable to other triad 
regions which have competitive financial industries of their own. Only in developing 
countries, where fiscal instability has led many consumers to distrust local financial 
institutions, can the reputation of these companies provide a true competitive advantage. 
Even here, banks are restricted from entering some business lines or are unwilling to 
enter risky businesses. The relative size of these markets with respect to the foreign 
bank’s home-region market makes the significance of these developing regions small in 
drafting overall strategy.  
 
Cases 
We now discuss five cases:- Citigroup, Deutsche Bank, Bank of America, Crédit Suisse, 
and JP Morgan Chase. These are the five largest banks in the top 500 list. 
 
Citigroup  
Overcoming cultural barriers, different regulations, and financial systems makes 
establishing a truly global bank very difficult. No one has done it as well as Citigroup’s 
Citibank. Formed in 1998 by the merger of Citicorp and Travellers Group, in 2001 
Citigroup was the largest financial MNE, and it had a presence in over 100 countries 
around the world.    8
  Citigroup is a financial services holding company whose activities are conducted 
through four business segments: Global Consumer, Global Corporate and Investment 
Bank, Private Client Services, Global Investment Management, and Proprietary 
Investment Activities. In turn, each of these business units is further segmented. The 
Global Consumer unit, for instance, includes Cards, Consumer Finance, and Retail 
Banking (including Citibank) while the Global Investment Management arm includes 
Life Insurance and Annuities, Private Bank, and Asset Management.  
Despite its global scope, Citigroup is a very home-region based North American 
business, and this is true in virtually every line of business. Indeed, Citibank became less 
global after the merger with Travellers in 1999 as the latter’s insurance business was very 
localized, and this offset much of Citibank’s banking diversification in South America 
and Asia. In 2002, Citigroup also acquired Banamex, one of the largest banks in Mexico, 
further strengthening its position within the NAFTA region. Today, 69% of the group’s 
income is derived from within the North American free trade area. Within Citigroup’s 
largest segment, Global Consumer, 73.1% of income is derived from North America. 
Similarly, 88% of all Global Investment Management income was derived from 
Citigroup’s home region. Together, 51.9% of the income derived from its Global 
Corporate and Investment Bank and its Private Client Services was intra-regional.    
Table 4 displays data on Citigroup’s regional indicators for its consumer banking 
division. Over 70% of the company’s revenue is derived from its home region of the 
triad. NAFTA also accounts for 77.1% of all accounts, but only for 45.5% of all deposits.  
Table 4 here 
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  In 2002, Citigroup International (which reports revenues outside of North 
America) had revenues of $21.5 million, or slightly over 30% of total revenues. Customer 
accounts outside of North America total $50 million. No region outside of North America 
accounts for a significantly large portion of revenues.  
Table 5 here 
 
Table 5 shows the foreign-to-total ratio of a number of Citigroup’s business lines. 
In all areas, except for commercial loans, the United States accounts for over 50% of the 
group’s operations.  
  Prior to the merger with Travellers, Citibank’s presence in developing countries 
was relatively more important. The success of that line of business should be analyzed 
with particular reference to the company’s ability to capture market share in developing 
countries, as opposed to other countries in the triad. Table 4 above reports that 24% of 
Citibank’s consumer banking deposits originate in non-industrialized countries in Asia. 
This is a higher percentage than for Western Europe or Japan. In addition, Citigroup has 
almost twice as many branches and offices outside the core triad markets as it does in its 
own home region.      
Citibank enters a developing country with its own marketing strategy. In the first 
stage of development, the bank caters to the global customer (usually a large corporation) 
by providing short-term loans, cash management, and foreign exchange services. During 
a country’s second stage of development, as demand grows in the face of a burgeoning 
middle class, Citibank begins to offer personal financial products.  
  Citibank’s experience in China illustrates the political risk of foreign expansion 
and the company’s international expansion strategy. Citibank opened its first office in 
China in 1902 but was thrown out by the new Chinese communist government of   10
Chairman Mao in 1949. Even after Citibank was allowed back into the country, its 
business was mainly restricted to foreign currency. China’s market potential, however, 
always attracted the bank, and when the country began to show interest in opening its 
borders and joining the WTO, Citibank stepped in as a key broker in negotiations with 
the U.S. government. The bank’s efforts are paying off. In the 1990s, the Chinese began 
to open their economy and make commitments for further reforms. By 2001, import 
tariffs had been decreased to an average of 15% from 44% in 1992. Import tariffs are 
expected to continue to decrease and average 9% by 2006.  
  Today, the bank’s revenue from corporate business in China is still one-fifth of 
that of South Korea. Deregulation will not only allow Citibank to open fully functional 
branches, it will also attract the burgeoning MNEs market and local clients. Citibank can 
also benefit from large local companies who seek to do international business. Among 
these is Legend, a Chinese PC manufacturer, that today controls over 25 % of the 
domestic market and is yet unknown outside the mainland.  
  Citibank’s second marketing stage for emerging markets is expanding into 
personal banking. Though personal banking has not yet been deregulated, Citibank is 
already applying for a license in China. In early 2003, Citibank was the first foreign bank 
to be granted a license to offer internet banking to foreign and local companies as well as 
consumers. A significant portion of Citibank’s income comes from credit cards. Citibank 
is hoping that increases in disposable income among middle-class Chinese will prove 
profitable. Once the credit card market becomes saturated, the bank is likely to move 
consumers into mortgages, personal loans, pension funds, and other financial products.  
  Though Citibank has a definite first-mover advantage in the Chinese market, it 
still faces competition from domestic banks, such as the Industrial and Commercial Bank 
of China and other large foreign competitors, such as the HSBC, which also has extensive   11
experience in the region. As of 2000, there were 71 foreign financial institutions 
operating in some form in Shanghai.  
  Citigroup’s international expansion into triad markets and non-triad markets is 
highly dependent on the expansion of MNEs. These MNEs have created a market for a 
bank that can handle their financial needs across national borders, and this then leads to a 
stable income generation stream for the bank. Citigroup offers stability and tailored 
know-how for MNEs that might not be replicated by more locally-focused banks. In fact, 
only HSBC can claim to have as large a scope of operations in this market niche. Market 
entry into this niche is blocked by the relatively large investments required for 
international expansion; know-how and building a reputation must be undertaken to 
compete successfully. Citigroup and HSBC both entered this market at an early stage, 




In 2002, Deutsche Bank derived 66.9% of its revenues from its home-region market of 
Europe, half of which was derived from Germany. North America accounted for 24.2% 
of total revenues. The remainder originated in Asia-Pacific, Africa, and South America. 
Similarly, although over 60% of the bank’s employees reside in foreign countries, 71% 
are located in Europe. Although Deutsche Bank has customers from 76 countries, 
aspirations to become a global lending provider and labels itself a “universal bank,” it is 
not a global company, but a home-region company with a significant presence in the 
United States.  
  In 1999, Deutsche Bank acquired Bankers Trust for $9.2 billion, more than twice 
its book value. The move was meant to support global ambitions and improve the group’s   12
investment banking arm. At the time, Bankers Trust was the eighth largest U.S. bank, 
assuring a significant, if not major, presence for Deutsche Bank in the American market. 
In addition, Deutsche Bank incorporated Bankers Trust’s skills in equity underwriting 
and high-yield debt to its portfolio while strengthening some of its own operations.  
  Deutsche’s drive to become a global bank with strong investment banking 
capabilities has been supported by other acquisitions. In 1989, Deutsche purchased 
Morgan Grenfell, a UK based merchant bank. Spain’s Banco de Madrid was acquired in 
1993, and in 1998 Crédit Lyonnais of Belgium was added to its portfolio. The fall of the 
USSR also meant that Deutsche could expand not only into East Germany but also into 
other Eastern European countries. In 1995, Deutsche opened a branch in Warsaw, and a 
year later a subsidiary was established in Hungary. In Asia, Deutsche Bank acquired a 
Japanese trust bank and an Australian fund-management company in 1997. More 
recently, it acquired Scudder, a U.S. asset-management firm in 2002.  
  Deutsche Bank has 1,711 branches worldwide. In 2002, 936 of these banks were 
in Germany. Yet, Deutsche is not looking to become a global retail bank. Instead, the 
firm wants to get out of small-scale banking in Germany altogether and become a global 
investment power house.  
  Germany’s retail banking system is heavily regulated and fragmented, and despite 
its size Deutsche accounts for a fraction of domestic deposits. Deutsche Bank is one of 
four large private German banks that compete with state-owned banks. Competition from 
mutual and savings banks is likely to result in losses in this market. Meanwhile, 
guaranteed state-owned regional banks can access funds in capital markets at lower 
interest rates. With reported costs of 80% of their income, compared to 60% by other 
European competitors, German banks are continuously ranked at the bottom of the stack. 
To add to its national complaints, Germany’s labor laws make hiring and firing personnel   13
very difficult and costly. This explains the bank’s creating of Bank 24 in 1994 to combine 
its branch network and online banking. This can potentially allow the divestiture of all 
retail banking operations.  
  Deutsche is also highly susceptible to the German market and the broader 
European market. The recent collapse of German companies, including Philipp 
Holzmann, the Kirch Group, and Fairchild Dornier cost German banks millions.  
   Deutsche’s international ambitions and move into investment banking are heavily 
driven by regulations in its domestic market. Its past acquisitions and new strategy do not 
guarantee a carving of this market. Other banks, such as UBS, attempted similar 
strategies only to find themselves in dire straits. Nonetheless, Deutsche Bank is 
successful in securities, foreign exchange, and asset management which might provide an 
edge against competitors. Mergers and acquisitions, however, are a profitable area the 
bank is hoping to strengthen but has not yet successfully done so. In addition, the 
acquisition of other localized banks, such as Banker’s Trust, does not provide the 
necessary know-how for global expansion. At best, the bank can hope to gain a bi-
regional scope with its European and U.S. arms acquiring know-how in inter-regional 
transactions across two regions of the triad. Deutsche is now best positioned to become a 
bi-regional bank with the potential for luring the business of European firms doing 
business in the United States. Whether or not Deutsche will be able to successfully 
compete in the U.S. investment banking market, where domestic companies are already 
world leaders, or to lure U.S. MNEs with operations in Europe, has yet to be seen.  
 
Bank of America 
 
A leading financial services firm, Bank of America’s strength is primarily its home-
region retail and corporate banking expertise. The bank’s 30 international offices, which   14
serve customers in over 150 countries, do not translate into a significant international 
presence. In 2002, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa accounted for 3.4% of Bank of 
America’s revenues. Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean accounted for 3.1%. The 
United States and Canada accounted for 93.5% of all revenues; this represents an increase 
from 92.9% in 2001. In terms of total assets, 92.5% are located in the United States and 
Canada.   
Between 1986 and 1998, NationsBank negotiated a series of acquisitions to 
strengthen its domestic position, including Bankers Trust of South Carolina (1986), First 
Republic Bank of Texas (1988), Missouri’s Boatman’s Bancshares (1996), Florida’s 
Barnett Banks (1996), and Montgomery Securities (1997). In 1998, the bank’s major 
expansion plans concluded with the purchase of Bank of America, and the new entity 
took on that name. The timing was right. Regulations that had prevented banks from 
operating across state borders were completely eliminated in 1994. By 2002, Bank of 
America was ranked as the largest U.S. bank in terms of branches. Consolidation, 
however, did not turn into a competitive advantage. The new Bank of America was 
riddled with bad loans and a cost-cutting strategy to justify the price of acquisitions that 
jeopardized the quality of its customer service and hampered attempts to expand 
internationally.  
A home-region based company with a national strategy, Bank of America, has a 
competitive edge in the extremely competitive U.S. retail banking market, but not a 
significant presence in any foreign market. To further broaden its scale and scope, large 
investments to diversify its revenue generation and customer base have been undertaken. 
Nonetheless, significant competition within the related markets has led to only minor 
penetration by the bank into institutional and investment markets. A growing expertise in 
asset management and investment banking may play a pivotal role if the bank seeks to   15
become a major global competitor. However, it will be difficult for a product-oriented, 
low-cost player to compete in the higher-end services that will allow for such growth.  
 
Crédit Suisse Group 
 
Crédit Suisse Group (CSG) origins date back to 1856 when the Schweizerische 
Kreditanstalt was founded to help finance railway construction and industrialization in 
Switzerland. CSG rose from being a Swiss railway finance company to one of the 
world’s most revered banks by developing products that meet the diverse needs of 
corporate, private, and retail customers.  
The Swiss banking group utilized its home country’s stringent banking/secrecy 
laws to position itself as an international banking power. While CSG has significant 
operations in 23 countries, based on the distribution of its revenues and assets across the 
global triad (North America, Europe, and Asia-Pacific), it remains a home-region firm. 
Europe accounts for 64.5% of CSG’s revenues while the Americas account for an 
additional 28.0%.  
The group entered the U.S. market in 1940 by opening a branch in New York. In 
1978, CSG began to cooperate with First Boston, Inc. of the United States, and in 1990 it 
acquired a controlling position in the firm. CSG acquired Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, a 
U.S. investment bank in 2000. Crédit Suisse First Boston (CSFB), as the U.S. subsidiary 
of CSG is known, was considered one of the most successful firms in Wall Street during 
the booming 1990s.  
However, by the early 2000s, the company was running into trouble. Along with 
other banks, it was being investigated over the advice and financing it provided to Enron. 
CSFB had entered a partnership with Enron that was used to hold unprofitable assets and 
eventually contributed to the company’s bankruptcy. In 2002, the state of Massachusetts   16
brought a civil case against CSFB for fraud, accusing the bank of intentionally giving bad 
advice to small investors.  
In 1999, the Japanese Financial Supervisory Agency (FSA) ordered Crédit Suisse 
Financial Products (CSFP), the derivatives arm of CSFB, to halt all business in Japan. 
CSFP combined investment and commercial banking disregarding Japanese law, 
destroyed documents, and obstructed the FSA investigation. However, the FSA did not 
order CSFP to indefinitely stop operations as a result of any of these things, but because 
it deemed the products the CSFP offered were “inappropriate”. In 2002, the United 
Kingdom Financial Services Authority fined Crédit Suisse First Boston International 
(CSFBI), formerly CSFP, £4 million for attempting to mislead Japanese authorities about 
the extent of its Japanese operations between 1995 and 1998 and for destroying 
documents. At the time, this was the highest fine the UK authority had imposed on a 
firm.  
The CSG has had to come to the rescue of its international operations, setting 
aside hundred of millions of dollars to help CSFB through legal suits. CSG is perhaps one 
of the best examples of how government regulations and political risk can hinder the 
banking industry from expanding into foreign markets.       
 
JP Morgan Chase 
With $29.6 billion and $1.6 billion in revenues and net income, respectively, JP Morgan 
Chase is a dominant player in the financial services industry. Today, JP Morgan Chase is 
globally recognized for its retail and investment banking, a combination of the 
competitive market position in credit cards, home finance, and auto finance that Chase 
brought to JP Morgan when the companies merged in 2002. Despite this global 
reputation, its operations are mainly North American based. In 2002, 73% of its revenues   17
originated in the United States, an increase from 67.7% the year before. Europe, the 
Middle East, and Africa, on the other hand, only accounted for 17.3%. Asia accounted for 
a measly 6.4%. The remaining 2.5% of revenues were derived from other regions, 
including Latin America. In 2001, consumer and commercial loans were 99% and 63% 
domestic, respectively. The broadened Americas account for 63% of JP Morgan’s 
treasury and security service. Finally, 73% of both investment management and private 
banking is based in the Americas, mainly in the United States. JP Morgan Chase is 
another North American regional bank. The group is currently a home-triad based firm 
that, while recognized for its global expertise, remains locally focused.  
Recently, JP Morgan is attempting to pioneer geographic diversification into 
developing countries of the financial industry’s downstream knowledge base. In 2003, JP 
Morgan transferred its economic research work to Mumbai, India. By hiring abundant, 
and underpaid, local financial services workers, JP Morgan hopes to decrease costs while 
attracting the best graduate economists. Their jobs would consist of providing analysis of 
companies and research reports for investors. JP Morgan insists that the quality of the 
work will not deteriorate even if the research is being performed by workers in a foreign 
region with very different circumstances. Nonetheless, to ensure quality, principal 
analysts in major triad markets will collect information from Indian researchers to 
produce final reports. Whether JP Morgan will be able to transfer a substantial amount of 
its production to international offices is yet to be seen.  
JP Morgan Chase is predominantly an investment bank that is in the process of 
diversifying itself through a growing retail and consumer financial services business. In 
2002, the group’s acquired position via Chase Manhattan in credit cards, home finance, 
and auto finance buoyed its financial performance in a weak capital market. However, the   18
firm continues to be focused largely on North America, and it will struggle to grow into a 
global company unless it acquires a largely foreign firm in the future. 
 
Conclusions 
Along with all other sectors, the world's banking industry operates on a regional, not a 
global, basis.  Of the 40 banks in the world's largest firms, none are global, and 39 are 
home-region oriented, with one being host-region oriented. These 40 banks have an 
average of 78.3% of their sales in their home region of the triad.  The other 27 financial 
services in the top 500 also have most of their sales in their home regions, an average of 
71.9%.  The five case studies in the paper further demonstrate the lack of globalization in 
banking and finance and the need for business strategy to take account of the realties of 
regional activities. 
   19
References 
 
 Citigroup Allowed to Build Mansion in Shanghai,” The People’s Daily, December 4, 
2000.  
 
“CSFB in Enron Probe,” BBC.co.uk, March 1, 2002. 
 
“Deal-making Done,” Economist, January 25, 2001. 
 
 “Deutsche’s Big Gamble,” Economist, May 9, 2000. 
 
 “Deutsche’s American Dream,” Economist, January 31, 2002. 
 
 “Enron-tainted Bank Reassures Investors,” BBC News, July 24, 2002. 
 
“Germany’s Banking Titans Are in Trouble,” Economist, May 13, 2002. 
 
 “Jobs Go At Crédit Suisse,” BBC.co.uk, February, 25, 2003. 
 
“JP Morgan Sets Up Research Team in India,” BBC News, April 28, 2003. 
 
 “Shooting the Messenger,” Economist, August 5, 1999. 
 
“The Great Swiss Hope,” Economist, May 16, 2002. 
 
 “UK Slaps Record Fine on Swiss Bank,” BBC.co.uk, December 19, 2002. 
 
“We’re Staying Deutsche, Says Deutsche Bank,” BBC News, February 24, 2003. 
 
Deutsche Bank, Annual Report, 2002. 
 
Bank of America, Annual Report, 2002. 
 
Braintrust Research Group, The Regional Nature of Global Multinational Enterprises 
(Toronto: Braintrust Research Group), 2003. 
 
Crédit Suisse Group, Annual Report, 2002. 
 
Grosse, R. (2004). Are the Largest Financial Institutions Really 'Global'? Management 
International Review, Special Issue, 44(4) forthcoming. 
 
European Commission, Report on United States Barriers to Trade and Investment, 2000, 
(Brussels, European Commission, July 2002). 
 
Miller, Karen Lowry and Jack Ewing, “Fixing Deutsche Bank,” Business Week, July 19, 
1999.  
 
Rugman, Alan M., The End of Globalization, London: Random House and New York: 
Amacom-McGraw Hill, 2000.   20
Rugman, Alan, M., The Regional Multinationals, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005. 
 
Rugman, Alan M. and Cecilia Brain, “Multinationals are Regional, not Global,” 
Multinational Business Review 11:1 Spring 2003: 3-12. 
 
Rugman, Alan M. and Alain Verbeke, "A Perspective on Regional and Global Strategies 
of Multinational Enterprises". Journal of International Business Studies, 35(1), pp. 3-18, 
2004.  
 
The Regional Nature of Global Multinational Activity (RNGMA) database available at 
www.kelley.iu.edu/ciber/publications.cfm, 2003. 
 
Shari, Michael, Brian Bremner, Heather Timmons and Becky Gaylord, “Citibank 
Conquers Asia,” Business Week (int'l edition), February 26, 2001. 
 
Spaeth, Anthony, “China's Legend In The Making,” Time.com, May 8, 2000. 
   21
 
 
Table 1: The Top 500 MNEs, by Industry 
Industry Category No of Firms in the Fortune 500 No. of Firms in the RNGMA  % of total
Manufacturing 206 180 87.4             
1 Aerospace and Defense 11 11 100.0           
2 Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals 19 18 94.7             
3 Computer, Office & Electronics 39 36 92.3             
4 Construction, Building Materials and Glass 12 11 91.7             
5 Energy, Petroleum & Refining 43 31 72.1             
6 Food, Drug & Tobacco 18 14 77.8             
7 Motor Vehicle and Parts 31 29 93.5             
8 Other Manufacturing  13 13 100.0           
9 Natural Resource Manufacturing 20 17 85.0             
Services 294 200 68.0             
1 Banks 62 40 64.5             
2 Entertainment, Printing & Publishing 9 9 100.0           
3 Merchandisers 77 63 81.8             
4 Other Financial Services 58 27 46.6             
5 Other Services 25 21 84.0             
6 Telecommunications & Utilities 43 27 62.8             
7 Transportation Services 20 13 65.0             
Total 500 380 76.0             
 
 
Data are for 2001.  22
 
Table 2: The Regional Nature of the Banking Industry 
 
                     North America 
   Europe 
   Asia-Pacific 
  
    500        Revenues    F/T   % intra  % of total 
  % of total 
  % of total 
 
    Rank   Company  Region   in bn US$   Sales   regional  sales 
   sales 
   sales 
  
              
   
   
 
Host-region oriented          
   
   
 
1  136  Santander Central Hispano Group  Europe           30.4        66.1         44.3              55.7  
 l            44.3 
   na 
 
              
   
   
 
Home-region oriented          
   
   
 
1  27  Deutsche Bank  Europe           66.8       69.0         63.1              29.3  
           63.1 
             6.5 
 
2  31  Credit Suisse   Europe           64.2       73.3         60.9              34.9  
 l            60.9 
             4.1 
 
3  47  Bank of America Corp.  North America           52.6   na         92.9              92.9  
 a              3.5 
 m              2.7 
 
4  54  JP Morgan Chase & Co  North America           50.4   na         67.7              67.7  
 z            23.2 
 m              6.7 
 
5  59  UBS(q)  Europe           48.5       62.0         58.0              37.0  
 l            58.0 
             5.0 
 
6  82   Mizuho Holdings    Asia-Pacific            41.5       30.3         74.4              19.7  
             5.8 
            74.4 
 
7  85  Fortis (q)  Europe           40.5   na         64.3              21.4  
 z            64.3 
   na 
 
8  115  Royal Bank of Scotland  Europe           33.8        19.0         81.0              12.0  
 z            81.0 
 u    na 
 
9  137  Sumitomo Mitsui Banking  Asia-Pacific           30.2        22.4         83.4              11.1  
 l              5.6 
            83.4 
 
10  150  HBOS  Europe           27.8          7.9         92.1   na  
           92.1 
 u    na 
 
11  154  Barclays  Europe           27.6    na         88.0                6.0  
 z            88.0 
   na 
 
12  165  Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group  Asia-Pacific           26.1    na         64.4              23.6  
             7.0 
            64.4 
 
13  168  DZ Bank  Europe           26.0    na         85.6   na  
           85.6 
   na 
 
14  174  UFJ Holdings (q)  Asia-Pacific           25.3        29.4         78.5              15.5  
             6.1 
            78.5 
 
15  186  Bank One Corp.  North America           24.5    na       100.0             100.0  
   na 
   na 
 
16  191  Société Générale   Europe           23.9    na         77.3              15.6  
           77.3 
             3.6 
 
17  193  Commerzbank  Europe           23.8    na         85.5                8.5  
           85.5 
             3.0 
 
18  201  Westdeutsche Landesbank  Europe           23.1    na         80.0              12.8  
           80.0 
             5.1 
 
19  206  Lloyds TSB Group  Europe           22.8    na         81.2   na  
           81.2 
 u    na 
 
20  211  Wachovia Corp.  North America           22.4    na       100.0             100.0  
              -   
               -   
 
21  242  IntesaBci  Europe           19.9        31.6         80.4   na  
           80.4 
   na 
 
22  259  Crédit Lyonnais  Europe           18.8        28.0         82.0                8.0  
           82.0 
             7.0 
 
23  272  Almanij  Europe           18.1        21.0         97.9                1.9  
           97.9 
               -   
 
24  280  Abbey National  Europe           17.8          4.0         99.5                0.5  
           99.5 
               -   
 
25  283  Washington Mutual  North America           17.7    na       100.0             100.0  
   na 
   na 
 
26  294  Landesbank Baden-Wurttemberg  Europe           16.9    na         94.8                2.7  
           94.8 
             2.5 
 
27  299  Royal Bank of Canada (q)  North America           16.5        28.3         71.7              71.7  
 c    na 
   na 
 
28  304  U.S. Bancorp  North America           16.4    na       100.0             100.0  
              -   
               -   
 
29  320  Bayerische Landesbank  Europe           15.8    na         82.1              12.9  
 z            82.1 
             5.2 
 
30  361  CIBC  North America           13.9        39.8         79.7              79.7  
 a    na 
   na 
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Table 2 (Con’t) 
 
                     North America 
   Europe 
   Asia-Pacific 
  
    500        Revenues    F/T   % intra  % of total 
  % of total 
  % of total 
 
    Rank   Company  Region   in bn US$   Sales   regional  sales 
   sales 
   sales 
  
              
   
   
 
31  366  Bank of Nova Scotia (q)  North America           13.7        35.9         71.2              71.2  
 a    na  
   na 
 
32  370  Toronto-Dominion Bank  North America           13.6        28.5         86.6              86.6  
 a    na  
   na 
 
33  395  Norinchukin Bank  Asia-Pacific           12.9    na         90.6                2.2  
             7.2  
            90.6 
 
34  419  Nordea  Europe           12.2   na       100.0   na  
         100.0  
   na 
 
35  449  Bank of Montreal (q)  North America           11.2       46.5         70.7              70.7  
 a    na  
   na 
 
36  461  Danske Bank Group (q)  Europe           10.9       27.5         94.3                5.1  
           94.3  
             0.6 
 
37  463  Daiwa Bank Holdings  Asia           10.9   <10   >90   na  
   na  
   >90 
 j  
38  473  Bankgesellschaft Berlin (q)  Europe           10.6       22.2         77.8   na  
           77.8  
   na 
 
39  475  Norddeutsche Landesb. (q)  Europe           10.6       18.9         94.8                2.9  
           94.8  
             2.3 
 
              
   
   
 
Weighted Average*             25.3            78.3   
   
   
 
Total             1,010.9           
     




Numbers might not add up due to rounding.     
Data  are  for  2001          
Notes: a. Canada and the U.S.; z. United States; l. Americas;  m. Europe, Middle East and Africa; u. United Kingdom; j. Japan; f. includes Africa.  
           
q. UBS: Calculated using data on operating income from the Annual Report; Fortis: Europe is Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg.  
Numbers are estimates using total revenues, net of interest expense; UFJ: Estimated using ordinary income figures from the Annual Report; Royal 
Bank of Canada: Revenues are estimated using gross revenues as reported in the Annual Report; Bank of Montreal: Estimated using net income 
business mixed as reported in the Annual Report; Bank of Nova Scotia: Revenues are estimated using income figures as reported in the Annual 
Report; Bankgesellschaft Berlin: Estimated using income data as reported in the Annual Report. Data for Europe only includes Germany; 
Norddeutsche Landesb: Data are calculated using income figures as reported in the Annual Report.           
      
* Weighted average is calculated by using the size of firms according to revenues.     
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Table 3: The Regional Nature of Other Financial Services Industries 
 
 
                     North America 
   Europe 
   Asia-Pacific 
  
    500        Revenues    F/T   % intra  % of total 
  % of total 
  % of total 
 
    Rank   Company  Region   in bn US$   Sales   regional  sales 
   sales 
   sales 
  
              
   
   
 
Host-region oriented          
   
   
 
1  20  ING Group   Europe           83.0      77.3         35.1              51.4  
          35.1 
             3.4 
 
              
   
   
 
Home-region oriented          
   
   
 
1  9  General Electric  North America         125.9      40.9         59.1              59.1  
 z           19.0 
             9.1 
 
2  18  Allianz  Europe           85.9      69.4         78.0              17.6  
 l           78.0 
             4.4 
 f  
3  30  AXA (q)  Europe           65.6      77.3         51.2              24.1  
 z           51.2 
            19.9 
 
4  34  American International Group  North America           62.4   na         59.0              59.0  
 a    na 
   na 
 
5  50  Assicurazioni Generali (q)  Europe           51.4      67.2         91.4                1.7  
 a           91.4 
   na 
 
6  52  Fannie Mae  North America           50.8         -         100.0             100.0  
 z              -   
               -   
 
7  63  State Farm Insurance Cos.  North America           46.7         -         100.0             100.0  
             -   
               -   
 
8  73  Morgan Stanley (q)  North America           43.7      25.0         75.0              75.0  
 z           17.9 
             6.3 
 
9  79  Munich Re Group (q)  Europe           41.9      54.7         72.3              19.3  
          72.3 
             4.1 
 
10  95  Merrill Lynch (q)  North America           38.8      31.0         73.0              73.0  
          16.6 
 m              8.7 
 
11  96  Zurich Financial Services  Europe           38.7   na         51.0              38.3  
          51.0 
   na 
 
12  132  Goldman Sachs Group  North America           31.1       35.6         65.9              65.9  
 l           25.0 
             9.1 
 
13  144  Allstate  North America           28.9    na       100.0             100.0  
 a    na 
   na 
 
14  157  Prudential Financial  North America           27.2       17.0         83.0              83.0  
 z    na 
            13.3 
 j  
15  209  American Express  North America           22.6       24.7         75.3  75.3 
          11.0 
             6.5 
 
16  212  Lehman Brothers Hldgs.  North America           22.4       37.0         63.0              63.0  
 z           29.0 
   na 
 
17  222  Royal & Sun Alliance  Europe           21.5       55.1         64.8              27.1  
 l           64.8 
   na 
 
18  260  Loews  North America           18.8          -         100.0             100.0  
 z    na 
   na 
 
19  330  Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance  Asia-Pacific           15.2        2.0         98.0   na  
   na 
            98.0 
 j  
20 359  Household  International  North America           13.9        9.2         92.5              92.5  
 a    na 
   na 
 
21  432  Power Corp. of Canada  North America           11.9      32.4       100.0             100.0  
 a              -   
               -   
 
22  440  Cathay Life  Asia           11.6         -         100.0                 -   
             -   
          100.0 
 
23  445  Yasuda Fire & Marine Insurance (q)  Asia           11.3         -         100.0                 -   
             -   
          100.0 
 
24  453  Old Mutual (q)  Europe/Other           11.1       6.6         93.4   na  
   na 
   na 
 
25  465  Sun Life Financial Services  North America           10.9      76.9         83.5              83.5  
 a           12.4 
             2.8 
 
26  483  Manulife Financial (q)  North America           10.5      70.3         71.1              71.1  
 a    na 
            20.1 
 
              
   
   
 
Weighted Average*             37.2            71.9   
   
   
 
Total          1,003.6        
   
   
 
                       
     
     
  
Numbers might not add up due to rounding. Data are for 2001         
Notes: a. refers to Canada and the United States; z. refers to the United States only.  l refers to the Americas; f. includes Africa; m. refers Europe, the 
Middle East and Africa; j refers to Japan only. Weighted intra-regional sales average is weighted according to revenues. (q) AXA: Europe represents 
France, the UK, Germany and Belgium.  An additional category "other countries" might include other European nations; Assicurazioni Generali: Used 
premium income (€45.6 billion) to estimate geographic distribution of revenues; Morgan Stanley: Estimated using geographic information for net 
revenues; Munich Re Group: Calculated using geographic information on premiums (totaling €36.1 billion).  This represents 84% of revenues; Merrill 
Lynch: Estimated using net revenues from Annual Report; Yasuda Fire & Marine Insurance: Now part of Sompo, the Annual Report describes overseas 
sales as immaterial and does not report them; Manulife Financial: The data are estimated using sales by division (U.S., Canada and Asia) as reported 
in the Annual Report.* Weighted average is calculated by using the size of firms according to revenues.  na. not available     
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Table 4: International Operations of  Citigroup: Consumer Banking Division% of Total
 
   No. of 
Country/Region   Revenue  Accounts Deposits
 
NAFTA                         72.7                       77.1                         45.5 
Japan                         8.9                         3.3                         10.2 
Other Asia                         5.8                         6.2                         24.2 
Western Europe                         6.8                         6.4                           9.1 
Latin America                         3.6                         4.5                           7.1 
Other                         2.2                         2.5                           4.0 
 
Total                      100.0                      100.0                        100.0 
           
Source: Citigroup, Annual Report, 2001.   
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Table 5: Selected Indicators of Citigroup’s International Scope 
 
average volume in millions of dollars          
    U.S. as a % 
Indicator U.S. Foreign  of  Total
      
Investments 95,781 38,822  71.2
Brokerage Receivables  25,058 2,517  90.9
Trading Account Assets  81,241 37,304  68.5
Trading of Federal Funds and Securities  104,150 34,087  75.3
Consumer Loans  151,837 79,782  65.6
Commercial Loans  53,834 91,867  36.9
Employees 149,000 123,000  54.8
           
Source: Citigroup, Annual Report, 2001.     
 
 
 
 